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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: FUTURISM, 
CORPORATIONS AND THE STATE 
Frank Webster and Kevin Robins 
'The road to  the social use of technology runs through the rugged terrain of  
interest groups, privileged classes, national power, and self-satisfied decision- 
makers.' 
H.I.  Schiller. Mass Communications and American Empire. Kelley, New York, 1970, 
p. 150. 
The significance of information technology (IT)' lies in the breadth of its 
potential impact on society: on work, communications, political processes, 
education and entertainment. It offers not just the possibility, in the 
current economic crisis, of restructuring work in order to  gain greater 
control over that process the better to  increase productivity, but also the 
possibility of a new cycle of growth in both capital and consumer goods, 
facilitating the restructuring of modes of consumption and the strength- 
ening and recomposition of capital over patterns of leisure, communication 
and entertainment. 
To  date socialists have, understandably, adopted a defensive strategy 
by concentrating primarily upon the probable impact of micro-electronics 
on work and jobs.' Prognostications such as 'by early in the next century 
it will require no more than 10 per cent of the labour force to provide us 
with all our needs'3 have induced many on the Left t o  paint a bleak, 
dystopian picture of the future. However, this is not  the only image 
circulating: for this menacing and pessimistic scenario finds its utopian 
mirror-image in the prophecies of the many ideologues who are now 
heralding the new 'leisure society', the 'information society' of the 'silicon 
civilisation'. For these pundits unemployment and redundancy are seen as 
a reverse image: the loss of work is reformulated as the gaining of leisure. 
We are offered a future in which the work ethic has dissipated and in 
which we shall have a 'kind of affluent redundancy'4 that heralds a new 
phase of civilisation, the post-industrial era. 
We believe that these scenarios-the dystopia of unemployment, the 
utopia of leisure-are paradoxically complementary and both inadequate 
because each fails to understand the interconnections of work and leisure 
in our society. Not acknowledging that work and leisure are integrally tied 
they are unaware of the similarly close connections between production 
and consumption activities. Against such views in this article we shall urge 
that any socialist approach should be holistic and thus able to  consider 
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the impact of IT across related spheres of society which make demarcations 
between leisure and work, production and consumption, economy and 
society ambiguous. 
First, however, we want t o  make some observations upon the invocation 
of the 'leisure society' by many futurists. It would be wrong to  dismiss 
such utopias as mere ideologies, for if we scrutinise them carefully we 
find that they contain a rational kernel. Moreover, socialists have for the 
most part not  only abandoned the discussion of the future to  these oppo- 
nents, but they have also failed to  examine closely the concept of leisure. 
In consequence, when confronted with futuristic visions of the ideal- 
leisure-society they often have no language t o  undermine the position of 
their opponents. 
Information Technology and Futurism 
Optimistic forecasts of a 'leisure' or 'information' society have been 
propounded in a number of recent books, both academic5 and popular.6 
The latter represent a significant phenomena in themselves as publishers vie 
with each other to  announce the electronic era, the 'paperless revolution'. 
From these various texts there emerge a number of common themes 
relating to probable trends in the post-industrial, information-based 
society of the future. 
1. Administration. Society, it is argued, has become too large and 
complex, and, thereby, unwieldy and unmanageable. Christopher Evans 
complains that the 'world's pool of "facts" has swollen' (p. 102): 'our 
world suffers from information overload, and we can no longer handle i t  
unaided' (p. 67). The necessary aid is IT, viz. 'the computer is a tool for 
managing the mass society, since it is the mechanism that orders and 
processes the transactions whose huge number has been mounting almost 
exponentially because of the increase in social  interaction^'.^ 
2. Democracy. I t  is argued that this managed and administered society 
will also be a more democratic one. For Hyman, 'the wired society can 
tend t o  become a more democratic society by making a far wider range of 
information conveniently available. A few electronic communication 
channels under tight control is a recipe for dictatorship. Generous pro- 
vision of communication channels is the road to freedom' (p. 29). It is a 
common futurist theme that social problems and antagonisms are the 
result of insufficient communication and/or information. Throughout the 
texts t o  which we refer it is constantly asserted that IT will iron out the 
creases in democracy. Large for instance suggesting that 'if every home had 
a viewdata TV set, then democracy could-if we wanted-become literally 
government by the people, and instant government at  that, with daily 
push-button voting even on secondary issues' (p. 65). 
3 .  Afjluence. The solving of political and administrative problems is 
possible because economic problems have been dissipated in the electronic 
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Cockaigne of 'affluent redundancy' (Evans, p. 94). 'If the changes are 
conducted wisely, people will be able t o  set themselves free from the 
drudgery of production. . . Widespread automation could provide most of 
our material needs' (Burkitt and Williams, p. 42). The microprocessor will 
'at long last make the humanistic dream of universal affluence and freedom 
from drudgery a reality' (Evans, p. 207). From the ashes of the work ethic 
will rise the phoenix of leisure: 'people will have the opportunity of using 
more free time to  pursue their leisure interests, and more money to  spend 
on them' (Burkitt and Williams, p. 11). 
4. Ecology. Micro-electronics and IT will solve the problem of industrial 
pollution. Hyman suggests that 'the ecological movement and its associates 
and the silicon-chip-based revolution are in fundamental harmony and 
their proponents should make common cause' (p. 126). For James Martin, 
IT is one of those 'technologies that are environmentally sound, non- 
polluting, and non-destructive of the ecology of an overcrowded planet'.8 
5. The individual. 'The new revolution in communications makes 
possible both an intense degree of centralisation of power, if the society 
decides to  use it in that way, and large decentralisation because of the 
multiplicity, diversity, and cheapness of the modes of comm~nicat ion. '~  
Futurists argue that decentralisation is most probable: on the basis of new 
modes of communication 'there will be less centralised control over what 
people say and hear'.'' 
In such a decentralised society we shall be able to disperse the cloud of 
alienation that has shrouded industrial society. Hyman maintains, for 
example, that 'electronic money' could be one of the silicon chip's biggest 
contributions to  'the return of mankind to a human way of life'. And for 
Ithiel de Sola Pool, 'a picture begins t o  emerge of a society ever more 
individualised in its interests and tastes'." This theme is developed exten- 
sively in Anthony Smith's Goodbye Gutenberg which suggests that view- 
data systems 'individualise information': 'the individual is being offered, 
to an ever greater extent, individual access to a totality of information'. 
The new media will promote 'individualised life systems', giving people 
'the sense of their own and their possessions' uniqueness'. According t o  
Smith, we shall move 'from a narrow editorial centrality to  a profusion of 
individual choice'.'* 
Futurism and Socialism 
The very prevalence of these futurist images that now rain upon us from 
television, bookstalls and the press induces us t o  take them seriously. They 
represent capital's utopia, its promised post-industrial land: a futuristic 
mirage so tantalisingly discernible to  those now thirsting in the economic 
desert. One can readily see the ideological role of this planned, post- 
industrial society, in so far as it represents a dangerous disguise which 
permits a spurious escape from the anxieties surrounding the decisions and 
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happenings of the present. By offering a potential exit from the ills of the 
present electronic futurism floods in to fill an ideological vacuum. More 
than this, however, it is modelled upon, and becomes a caricature of, the 
image of a socialist society. 
The appropriation of socialist language and the socialist vision by the 
pundits of post-industrialism is explicit. For Anthony Hyman 'the magnifi- 
cent generosity of the new technology is at  last beginning to  make it 
possible for society to move in the direction of its old dream, never 
realisable but a splendid goal, the dream that was appropriated by Marxism 
and then lost in the monolithic politics of the twentieth century: from 
each and all according to  their inclination; to  each according to  need' 
(pp. 126-27). Elsewhere, Christopher Evans maintains that the world will 
change, 'and for the better, and without the long awaited revolution of 
the proletariat' (p. 208). 
The annexation from socialism of the language of social change is not  
to be lightly dismissed. By undermining and recuperating that aspect of 
socialism which talks of liberation and emancipation the ideologues of an 
electronic, post-industrial era threaten to structure and monopolise the 
terms of public debate while also blunting the critical edge of any socialist 
alternative by limiting i t  t o  'actually existing socialism'. Moreover, because 
the current response t o  IT from the Left is piecemeal, trying to  salvage 
jobs and negotiate working conditions in face of capital's initiatives, 
socialist reactions appear especially unimaginative and negative. In this 
situation it is not surprising that the futurists are confident of their ability 
to  engineer social change. I t  is, therefore, important at  the outset for 
socialists to show that behind the rhetoric of the 'information society' lies 
the reality of a managed, rationalised consumer capitalism. And it is 
necessary to move beyond this to reappropriate the language of liberation; 
to repossess the socialist tradition of utopian thought and generate an 
alternative image of a socialist future to  that offered by 'information 
society' seers. The precondition for any such reappropriation is to  reveal 
the absurdities of electronic futurism. 
Real Social Relations: The Power of Multinational Corporations in the 
IT Industry 
Behind the mask of futurism lies an imposing reality: the seemingly 
unstoppable juggernaut of multinational corporations, often moving in 
concert with state agencies. It is t o  this phenomenon that we now turn, 
taking heed of Raymond Williams's warning, issued a decade ago, that new 
technologies could be 'the tools of what would be, in context, a short and 
successful counter-revolution, in which, under cover of talk about choice 
and competition a few paranational corporations, with their attendant 
states and agencies, could reach further into our lives. . ." 
What we particularly wish to  indicate is the scale of the interests 
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involved in IT, the extent of the restructuring now being undertaken, and 
the current significance of directive state intervention in this strategic 
industry. In addition, by highlighting the close connections between 
economic imperatives and political control that underpin the development 
of IT we can give the lie to  those futurists and post-industrialists who 
imagine this new technology to  be some neutral and inherently beneficial 
force. Against such imaginings what we can illuminate is an apparently 
inexorable trend towards greater concentration and centralisation being 
spearheaded by corporate and state institutions. At the same time our 
examination will suggest the limits of perspectives which concentrate only 
on the impact of new technology on the labour process. Looking a t  the 
enormity of changes in corporate and state structures reveals the need to  
conceive of IT in a broad framework which enables recognition that it will 
result in the intrusion of capital across a very wide range of social relations: 
the extension of capitalist planning, rationality and social management; a 
more intensive and aggressive exploitation of the sphere of leisure and the 
further penetration of the private sphere. 
The growth of IT is creating a new industrial complex in which, as the 
head of Plessey observed, 'telephone, communications, data processing 
and electronics are increasingly converging into a huge fast-advancing 
industry'. With the distribution of computing, made possible by micro- 
electronics, and the linking of terminals through enhanced telecommunica- 
tions facilities, there has come about a demand for information networks, 
for integrated systems rather than discrete products. Corporations are now 
restructuring themselves in order t o  be able to  supply such data systems. 
A recent Hitachi report notes a greater interest in 'composite products 
requiring the combination of the technology of several of our divisions. . . 
We are working t o  use our electronic technology as a connecting element 
t o  tie together the products of our various sections.'14 
IT offers, then, the prospect of a future overarching communications/ 
computing information industry that threatens even to  break down the 
traditional barriers separating domestic (leisure) from business sectors. The 
'home of the future', offering integrated TV-based systems for enter- 
tainment, education, purchasing and accounting devices, is not  radically 
different technologically from the 'office of the future' which provides a 
number of functions via data-processing and telecommunications facilities 
linked t o  visual display units. 
Corporations previously ensconced in discrete areas, with established 
interests in distinct products and processes (e.g. computing, copying, 
telecommunications), are now having to rethink radically their strategies. 
Philips, in a representative comment, observes that 
in order to be able. . . to exploit the possibilities arising out of technological 
developments, a process of adjustment is necessary in many enterprises, partly 
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having regard t o  the changed market and cost relationships. This also applies to  
our enterprise. If our technological know-how and our experience in different 
market areas are to be deployed as effectively as possible, a process of far-reaching 
rationalisation, production concentration and regrouping is called for in our 
enterprise. 15 
This entails a fundamental process of restructuring by many corporations 
to  incorporate all major branches of IT within their spheres of competence. 
It further entails the hastening and consolidation of trends within capitalist 
organisations towards vertical integration (placing under one holding 
facilities for chip production through to  end-product manufacture) and 
horizontal integration (regrouping around a coherent range of products 
and processes such as office equipment). 
At present, however, this process of recomposition to  form a single 
integrated information sector is at  an early stage. Consumer electronics 
industries are working towards the establishment of integrated 'home 
entertainment systems' that incorporate TV, video, cable, computing and 
viewdata technologies (the intensification of domestic media consumption). 
And the business sector is moving (at a faster rate) towards the integrated 
'electronic office'. At the present time this latter is clearly the key area: 
capital is readily available for investment in technologies that promise 
to rationalise the labour process in the office (the Taylorisation of office 
work) and thereby to  increase productivity in this traditionally 'inefficient' 
sector. Nonetheless, both domestic and business sectors are becoming 
imbricated. Viewdata systems, for example, originally developed as an 
extension of television for leisure/private use, are now being marketed as 
an information tool for the office. Successful exploitation in this sector 
will decrease the cost of equipment and facilitate a further stage of growth 
in the consumer market. 
Whilst it is as yet unclear which corporations will manoeuvre themselves 
into a position of market dominance we do know who the contestants in 
this struggle will be. The IT sector is already dominated by a select and 
powerful group of multinational corporations: IBM, AT&T (ironically 
the largest interest of all while the only one restricted t o  North America), 
ITT, Xerox, Siemens, Philips, RCA, GTE, Ericsson, GEC, Honeywell, 
Burroughs, NCR, Eastman Kodak, Thomson-CSF, Hitachi, Matsushita, 
Sony, Mitsubishi, CGE, Saint-Gobain, Exxon, Schlumberger. These 
organisations are able to  dominate the IT market for a number of reasons: 
a) they have the resources to offer complete systems of compatible equipment; 
the trend towards integral systems impedes the access of smaller organisations to  
IT markets; 
b) they have an international reach and global strategies-vitally important in the 
IT industry, which provides the data processing and communications infrastructure 
that underpins the increasing internationalisation of political, economic and 
administrative structures. 
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C) they have the resources to undertake expensive R&D programmes (at the 
upper levels well in excess of one billion dollars per annum). They are also able 
to take over strategic companies and to buy expertise. 
Such characteristics as these cast doubt on extravagant claims that IT is an 
entrepreneur's paradise (a favoured theme of futurists): the business is 
restricted to  a few giant (if currently competing) oligopolies of a size that 
is without historical precedent. Smaller organisations will survive only by 
adopting the role of clients and sub-contractors to  these concerns. 
The outcome of the present phase of restructuring around IT which is 
taking place on a international scale is by no means certain. It is a far cry 
from the idea of a rational, managed 'information society' to the chaotic 
and unplanned strategies for arriving there, shaped as they are by market 
forces and aggressive competition between powerful capitals. We can see 
the ad hoc nature of current developments if we focus on the British IT 
industry. Such a close perspective also draws our attention to  the scale of 
the powerful economic interests that are the real forces-the blind 
architects-behind the post-industrial society. 
Three corporations (GEC, Thorn-EM1 and Racal) head the British 
effort in IT, with three others (Plessey, Ferranti and ICL) playing a strong 
supporting role. All three leaders have made major acquisitions in recent 
months in order to  strengthen their strategic position. The strategy of the 
largest, GEC (with about three hundred subsidiaries scattered around the 
globe) illustrates the tendencies towards vertical and horizontal integra- 
tion. Recently it has bought out Averys Ltd. as 'part of the company's 
plan for supplying office and business it has purchased the 
office equipment firm A.B. Dick, Circuit Technology and Scriptomatic to  
consolidate its position in the American market; it has negotiated deals to  
produce, under license, television sets with Hitachi and video tape-recorders 
with Ampex; and it has gained an agreement with Mite1 Corporation of 
Canada to  obtain their advanced integrated circuit technology. GEC, 
reputed to  be in possession of some E700 million for investment in 1979, 
has spent most of the money committed to date in the USA: it intends 
to  continue this policy of investment in the world's largest single market. 
GEC also made a bid for Decca in late 1979 but was beaten to  the 
merger by Racal which paid El06 million in April 1980. Racal, the most 
profitable European electronics firm, took over Decca not least for its 
'technological capabilities'17 and its established position in electronic 
warfare (the area where Racal made its fortune and which has fuelled its 
dramatic growth over the past decade from a turnover of E16.5 million 
to 36262.7 million). However, the merger had also much to do with Racal's 
extension into data communications (its largest contributor to  profits 
since 1979, when sales in this area jumped 1 8  per cent). Racal quickly 
reorganised Decca, selling off parts of the .company (television 
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manufacture, records and tapes) that did not fit into its corporate strategy, 
and forming a new company, Racal-Decca, t o  concentrate the whole of the 
capital goods interests into one group. During 1979 Racal also announced 
a big move into the computer-based office systems market by establishing 
a subsidiary, Racal Information Systems, and acquiring 85 per cent of 
Hyperon Consulting Engineers to help apply microprocessor technology to  
a range of communicating computers. More recently, Racal bought Tele- 
systems Network of America, a company specialising in data protocol 
converters, devices which are crucial to the planned extension into 
computer information networks. This in turn will join Racal's successful 
US data communications subsidiary Milgo (bought in the late seventies). 
Thorn, which acquired EM1 late in 1979, lacks strength in the major IT 
market of office systems, being an oddly heterogenous company with 
chiefly consumer electronics, defence and engineering interests. Significant- 
ly, its main strategy in the near future seems t o  be aimed, therefore, a t  
domestic IT systems (where it must tackle the mighty Japanese). It was 
this that stimulated Thorn's interest in EMI, a move which 'could not 
have been supported for its immediate benefits in terms of present profits 
but its importance in our stragegies for the 1980s is of great ~ i~n i f i cance ' . ' ~  
Thorn's plans to move towards the manufacture of integrated enter- 
tainmentlinformation systems for the home largely explains the appeal of 
EMI, since the latter has very substantial interests in music and leisure. 
Thorn clearly regards EMI's software capacity as complementary to its 
own television hardware capabilities. To this end, it divested itself of any 
EM1 holdings-for example medical scanners-extraneous to its own 
future strategy. 
Along with this vertical integration strategy, Thorn has also been 
coriducting a policy of hori7ontal integration, extending its range of 
consumer electronic goods by investing heavily in video tape and .video . . . 
disc (in conjunction in the UK with Victor Company (JVC) of Japan and 
with GE in America). It is now planning to  start video disc pressing 
facilities for European and US markets using EMI's expertise; is intro- 
ducing its TX9 and TXlO TV receivers as the most technologically advanced 
in the world; developing colour TV receivers which incorporate viewdata 
facilities; and producing, in combine with ICL, its own viewdata system- 
Thorn-tel-under the strategically important subsidiary Thorn Television 
Rentals. This is significant because, given the high percentage of UK homes 
which rent television, and with Thorn controlling a large part of that 
market, it can guarantee outlets for its manufacturing capacity. With EM1 
under its wing Thorn now has a strong supply of programme material 
(film, music, television shows-EM1 owned a large part of Thames 
Television) to  support its hardware capacity, enabling it t o  offer 'new 
products for those new markets just when the customer requires it'.'' 
More briefly, the fate of the second rank of corporations in the British 
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IT industry (Plessey, Ferranti, ICL) is more precarious; none is in an 
especially favourable position, economically or strategically, and there 
have been signs that they (or parts of them) may be absorbed into one or 
other of the leading three. Plessey, a defence and telecommunications 
group with a turnover nearly three times that of Racal, yet managing only 
a similar total profit in 1979, has a very large stake in telecommunications 
equipment (about one third of its sales) and, although outside this area it 
is weak (apart from defence), it is nonetheless important as regards IT in 
the UK, chiefly because of its 'developments in progress covering a compre- 
hensive range of data, voice and digital systems products'.20 To  this end it 
entered the office equipment market in 1979 by renaming Plessey Tele- 
communications Plessey Telecommunications and Office Systems and 
incorporating a specialist office systems subsidiary which will use Plessey's 
private digital exchange as the hub of its sales effort. As well as this entry 
into a major area of IT via its strengths in communications, Plessey's role 
as a supplier to  British Telecom (Plessey has 38 per cent of B.T.'s business 
for exchange products and more than 20 per cent of its sales in the UK go 
to  B.T.) is of special significance given the strategic position of the latter. 
Plessey also has by far the largest UK-owned integrated circuit operation, 
which it is developing on the basis of its telecommunications interests. 
Both these aspects of Plessey's business have attracted the attention of 
GEC in recent months while there are other parts of Plessey which would 
be attractive to  both GEC and Racal. 
Ferranti, an organisation specialising in electronics and computers, had 
to  be bailed out of bankruptcy by the then Labour government in the 
mid seventies (its 50 per cent holding owned by the NEB was returned 
only in 1980). I t  looked a very likely candidate for merger with Racal or 
GEC, despite its wishes to  remain independent, until 1980 results showed 
a dramatic recovery with interim profits up 83 per cent. Nevertheless, 
Ferranti's small size and established markets in defence information 
systems make it especially vulnerable to  takeover in the eighties. ICL, 
whose primary interest is the computer sector, was formed in 1968 by a 
government-led merger. Its concentration on large mainframe computers 
has confronted ICL with the formidable competition of IBM (which to  
date it has handled well, being the only computer company in Europe to  
have an equal share of the domestic market with IBM). The policy of main- 
frame production is now being revised in face of cheap and more powerful 
computing capacity being made available by micro-electronics. Whilst i t  
remains a significant company (despite a recent spate of crises-a 46 per 
cent drop in profitability in 1980, threats of US takeovers, large-scale 
redundancies and the sacking of senior management plus E200 million 
from the state to ease a liquidity problem), ICL will be forced to  augment 
its facilities if it is t o  compete in the IT arena. As with other second order 
corporations its future is uncertain, though surely traumatic as it is forced 
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t o  restructure. For the second order the choice is between establishing a 
particular niche in the industry or becoming subsumed, as strategic arms, 
within the larger empires. 
On a world scale, these British companies, all multinational enterprises 
with massive resources, are relatively small fry. Nevertheless, the process of 
jostling and manoeuvring for market supremacy is representative of what is 
happening in all advanced capitalist countries, a t  national and international 
levels. The so-called post-industrial or information society is effectively 
being shaped by multinational electronics corporations, now engaged in an 
unprecedented struggle that brings into conflict previously discrete sectors 
of that industry. National Semiconductor, a manufacturer of micro- 
electronic components, has, for example, developed its interests from 
microprocessors to  mini-computers, and is now entering the main computer 
market. Other microprocessor producers such as Texas Instruments and 
Intel are following the same pattern. And end-product manufacturers in 
various sectors (e.g. AT&T in telecommunications, Philips in consumer 
electronics) have developed in-house facilities for chip production. Else- 
where, computer manufacturers, notably IBM, are developing interests in 
telecommunications. And corporations traditionally involved in the latter 
sector (AT&T, GTE) are strengthening their computer capabilities. The 
growth of the IT industry has unleashed a centripetal force that is drawing 
all sectors of the industry together into the fierce vortex of competition. 
In this hazardous industry the most certain development is that towards 
integrated computer-communication systems for business use. Here the 
stakes are particularly high and the rewards potentially enormous. The 
really crucial developments are now occurring in the USA-crucial because 
they will have repercussions throughout the world. Also important to  note, 
in the light of our later observations on the role of the state in the European 
and Japanese IT industries, is the contrasting role being played by the 
American government, which is deregulating the IT sector in order to  
stimulate competition (a move easily explicable in terms of the particular 
strengths of leading US corporations). 
The US state has for some time been pursuing a policy of deregulation 
of telecommunications which, until the late sixties, was regarded as the 
'natural monopoly' of AT&T (still with over 80 per cent of the domestic 
market). This policy, according to a representative of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), intends that 'communications 
business entrepreneurs can be sure that the marketplace and not the 
government will decide their fate'. I t  results from a recognition of the 
changed circumstances brought about by IT: whilst the purveyors of data 
processing services have increasingly made use of telecommunications 
channels (cable, satellite, microwave radio) traditional communications 
interest have, with the growth of IT, encroached upon the area of 
data processing. AT&T has long been aware of both the promise and threat 
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that this new situation poses. Its response has been to  strengthen its 
interests in the computer sector whilst consistently fighting a rearguard 
action against encroachments onto its carrier monopoly. . . 
Competition over communications channels is not, of course, an end in 
itself. Control of this enabling technology is inseparable from achieving the 
maximum share of communications traffic. A major, and increasing, part 
of this traffic will consist of dataltext communication. So important is this 
that data processing and  telecommunication^ are now rapidly fusing into a 
single technological complex. 
In our 1979 Socialist Register article we began to  look a t  the growth of 
- 
data networks from the direction of comparatively small companies 
exploiting-and stimulating-the erosion of AT&T1s telecommunications 
monopoly. Since then afikrce struggle in the integrated computerlcom- 
munications sector has been fully unleashed by the 1980 decision of the 
FCC to  deregulate enhanced (i.e. text and data transmitting) tele- 
communications services. This has opened the path to  unfettered competi- 
tion between major telephone and data processing companies over the 
provision of computer-enhanced equipment and services. In this historic 
decision the FCC voted against requiring corporations offering computer- 
ised telecommunications services to get prior approval before offering such 
services, and it voted not to regulate the tariffs they charged. The FCC also 
freed AT&T from restrimions, allowing it t o  enter dataltext communica- 
tions. The FCC decision sets the scene for titanic battles between major 
communications and computing corporations as they fight for the IT 
market. 
The leading protagonists in the coming war are AT&T, Xerox, and 
IBM, with the phalanxes of ITT, GTE, Wang and RCA playing important 
supporting roles. The main confrontation is between AT&T and IBM, 
each preparing to  invade the other's previously sovereign territory, whilst 
defending its own empire. AT&T is trying to enter the data processing 
business and to  keep all but common carriers out of the telecommunica- 
tions business; while IBM feels the need to ensure that its computer 
products have an independent communications link on which to operate, 
thereby guaranteeing the viability of its planned 'office of the future'. 
All sides recognise that the next few years will be full of drama. Bell 
chairman C.L. Brown talks, for example, of 'head-to-head' competition 
being imminent-of AT&T being drawn into 'a corporate struggle-with 
IBM, RCA, Xerox and many other giants'.21 As we write we cannot tell 
whether the scene being set will indeed result in a fight which will leave 
some companies mortally wounded or whether a less bloody compromise 
will be found. 
The Role of'the State in the IT Industry 
It is evident that the growth of IT is resulting in profound upheavals in 
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the electronics industries: we have referred to the scale of this corporate 
restructuring, the dominance of multinationals, and the current struggle 
for supremacy in the lucrative US computer-communications sector. 
The rationale for entry and participation in these markets resides in the 
profit motive. Corporations are guided not by social needs, but by the 
demands of capital accumulation and any futurist speculator should first 
take note of these massive commitments of capital in the IT industry. 
However, in focusing only on the strategies of multinational corpora- 
tions in the IT sector our discussion remains as yet incomplete. Clearly, 
the 'information society' will not  depend only on the independent 
strategies of individual capitals in the electronics industry. At this stage, 
therefore, it is necessary to  refer to the important supportive and 
orchestrating role of the state. The IT industry represents an area in 
which the presence of the state is especially apparent. In the UK, for 
example, the state is intervening to: 
a) create a sense of awareness and acceptance of IT; 
b) speed the development of IT by funding and directing research and develop- 
ment; 
c) integrate and consolidate disparate corporate interests to meet expected 
competition from foreign corporations and state institutions; 
d) subsidise IT ventures from public funds and, if necessary, instigate IT 
industries under state auspices; 
e) act as an especially important market for IT products and services, particularly 
through defence spending; 
f )  create an IT infrastructure, i.e. the structural framework of an 'information 
society' (e.g. in legislation, education etc.). 
To some extent this state involvement may be explained historically. 
For, in Europe at  least, the national post, telegraph and telephone autho- 
rities (PTTs) have exercised a traditional monopoly over communications 
channels. The rationale for this has been a technical one: that communica- 
tions channels represent a scarce national resource and that a regulating 
agency is essential t o  establish agreed standards and protocols for operating 
national and international networks. On the whole these technical criteria 
have not to date been contested and telecommunications has been accept- 
ed as a 'natural monopoly'. Nonetheless, the political implications of 
state supervision of communications are extremely significant. All the 
more so when, as in the case of IT, telecommunications becomes inte- 
grated with data processing and storage (with all that implies for 
surveillance). 
However, the nature and scope of state involvement in the IT industry 
is also being shaped by other forces that derive from the strategic 
importance of the new technology and the nature of the present social 
and economic crisis. We want now to  outline what seem to  us to  be three 
of the most significant factors. 
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1. The 'Anarchy' of  Capitalist Production. We have argued that IT is of 
such strategic importance for capital because of the broad impact i t  will 
have on all spheres of society. No individual capital, however, has the 
resources or the planning capacity to ensure the successful establish- 
ment-and optimum exploitation-of IT. The objectives of individual 
capitals in competition are not necessarily those of 'capital in general'. 
It is therefore necessary for the state to  orchestrate and rationalise- 
in so far as this is possible-the 'selfish' and potentially 'anarchic' activities 
of individual capitals (like GEC, Racal etc.). 
In addition, the significance of IT is such that it will necessarily bring 
about profound social changes. Further social disruption will be produced 
as a result of the narrow interests pursued by multinational corporations. 
It therefore becomes the responsibility of the state to  smooth these up- 
heavals-again, in so far as this is possible. 
2. International Competition. A further reason for state involvement in 
IT arises from the enormous scale of foreign, particularly American, 
competition. The might of US corporations like AT&T and IBM is such 
that the American government has been able to 'withdraw' from the 
industry. Although it still plays a distinctly supportive role for capital, 
serving as an outlet for IT products and providing R&D funds, it has 
opted to  deregulate the industry, maintaining that market forces and 
competition between (strong) corporations will produce the most viable 
infrastructure for the 'information society'. The might of these corpora- 
tions is such that indigenous capital outside the USA, if it is t o  have any 
real chance of achieving a substantial market share in the international 
IT industry, requires the support of a strong and active state.22 
In France, Alain Minc and Simon Nora have recognised this difficulty 
of competing with American capital: 'the omnipotence of IBM throws 
the game off balance': 
The only 'cartel' capable of establishing a dialogue with IBM is one that could be 
formed from an alliance of telecommunications agencies. The basic task of the 
authorities, then, is to  strengthen the French role in this association. By acting as 
a lever in this way, they will realise the objectives and means for establishing a 
national communications policy. 
The French state, they argue, must intervene on behalf of French 
capital t o  create data banks; to  ensure network standardisation ; t o  establish 
a European capacity t o  build and launch communication satellites; and to  
strengthen and co-ordinate individual capitals. Nora and Minc provide an 
example of a self-conscious response to the 'd6fi americain', a recognition 
that the state must intervene to  'deal' in a coherent way with threats to  
(its) economic stability, the "social consensus", and national indepen- 
d e n ~ e ' . ~ ~  
3. The State as Social Capital: Eficiency and Control. In a discussion of 
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the role of technology in the capitalist labour process, David   or don^^ has 
distinguished between its introduction for reasons for quantitative 
efficiency and its introduction for reasons of qualitative efficiency. The 
former refers to the introduction of machinery in order to  'effect the 
greatest possible useful physical output from a given set of physical inputs'. 
Concern with quantitative efficiency derives from the need to increase 
productivity in the face of competition from other capitals. Qualitative 
efficiency, on the other hand, refers t o  the maximisation of 'the ability of 
the ruling class to reproduce its domination of the social process of pro- 
duction and minimise producers' resistance to ruling class domination of 
the production process'. It relates to  the use of technology to  control 
labour processes, and the determining factor in this case is the struggle 
between labour and capital. 
While i t  is dangerous to  extrapolate from the capitalist labour process 
to  social capital, nonetheless, we feel that it is important to try to under- 
stand the role of technology for the reproduction of the wider social 
relations (family, state, law, leisure, etc.) that are implicated in the 
accumulation of capital. We would argue that, in so far as i t  has become 
integrally involved in economic planning and management, the state too 
follows criteria of quantitative and qualitative efficiency. Thus, one aspect 
of the state's involvement in IT is to introduce a technology that will 
increase productivity, rendering indigenous industries more profitable and 
competitive on an international scale. The state's criteria here are precisely 
those of the multinationals, as Nora and Minc make clear. While warning 
that IBM 'will participate. . . in the government of the planet' (p. 72), 
that 'the politics of network systems will decide whether telematics 
remains the activity of some powerful fiefs or is distributed democratic- 
ally' (p. 84), their proposals are for 'rationalisation' of the French IT 
industry, union with AT&T against IBM because the 'interests of these 
behemoths are divergent' (p. 78), acceptance of 'increased unemployment' 
(p. 4), pursuit of 'new growth' and more 'foreign trade' (p. 60) as panaceas. 
In supporting the IT industry, the state is operating then according to  
criteria of quantitative efficiency. We are constantly told, in Britain, that 
'British industry is falling behind its overseas competitors' and that new 
technology can 'improve our export performance and reduce our depend- 
ence on imports'.25 Not only does this 'economic' rationale appear to  be 
self-evident and unproblematical, but also it is invariably presented as the 
sole criterion guiding the state's actions. 
The impact of IT will not, however, be restricted to  the 'economic' 
level: it will entail a significant social upheaval and recomposition. The 
state will attempt to exploit these social changes to the advantage of 
capital. That is, it will operate according to  criteria of qualitative 
efficiency-on the scale of social, rather than individual capital. I t  must 
seek to  establish the domination of the ruling class over the social process 
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of production and to minimise resistance to such domination, not just 
within the immediate process of production, but across the whole of 
society. The state, as that aspect of capital most able to  assess the interests 
of 'capital in general' (as opposed to that of individual capitals) must 
reassert the command relation of capital throughout society: the Thatcher 
government is well aware that productivity and competitiveness depends 
on a 'disciplined' working class. The reassertion of discipline is especially 
important for capital in the context of what Ralph Miliband has called 
a 'state of de-subordination', which effectively constitutes a repudiation of 
the integration of the working class into contemporary capitalist society.26 
Information technology provides some particularly significant means of 
'reintegrating' the working class back into the capital relation: through the 
provision of new consumer goods; through the increasing privatisation of 
leisure; through the transformation of labour processes; through sophistica- 
ted surveillance files, etc. As such, IT threatens to  extend to society as a 
whole that which TayIorism and Fordism initiated at  the level of the 
plant. This suggestion of a kind of 'social Fordism' should be seen in the 
light of Gramsci's observations on 'Americanism and Fordism'. We believe 
that the increasing interpenetration of methods of work and modes of 
living (and thinking) that Gramsci noted is now entering a new phase. 
Noting that the success of any nation state in social management is by n o  
means assured, we want now to  review the attempts of three such states 
to  choreograph the 'information revolution'. 
1. France. Ex-President   is card d '~s t a ing  recently outlined 
An active policy of government encouragement for the development of electronic 
components and of data processing. . . The creation of five industrial units in the 
field of integrated circuits, the setting up of an Agency for the promotion of data 
processing, the allocation of E 2 5 0  million of public money over five years for 
industrial development and the launching of new telecommunications 
services. . . 2 7  
This was both to  strengthen the French IT industry and to assist the 
growth of 'a new civilisation' based on 'telematique'. 
The French state is planning a framework of progress towards a forth- 
coming 'wired society1-a strategy which has been consciously influenced 
by the government report prepared in 1977 by Nora and Minc. The key to  
French policy is to create a mass domestic market for IT which in turn 
will provide a springboard for future export expansion. The centre-piece 
of this strategy is the replacement by the PTT of printed telephone 
directories with cheap electronic terminals linked to computerised data 
banks. Though initially these terminals will be simply for information 
regarding addresses and telephone numbers, their importance lies in the 
widespread introduction into society of computer terminals which can in 
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future be enhanced simply by extending the data held at  central 
computers. 
There are also plans from the PTT for viewdata and teletext systems as 
well as electronic mail services; France has had, since 1978, a nationwide 
data communications network (Transpac) and is due to  launch a satellite 
in 1983 (Teleiom 1) which, among other things, will offer sophisticated 
business communications services. The French system of viewdata, Teletel, 
is now competing for the enormous potential market that will come to 
that system which is accepted as the industry Standard. 
These initiatives follow a history of encouragement by the French state 
of an indigenous IT industry which has culminated in a restructuring into 
three large groups. The first involves a regrouping of the country's leading 
electrical group, Compagnie Gknirale dlElectricitk (CGE), whereby all the 
company's activities in private communications, computer systems, 
peripherals and services are to be brought together under Compagnie 
Ginirale dlElectrique. The second reorganisation coincides with a share- 
holding change in late 1979 at Cii Honeywell Bull (53 per cent French, 
47 per cent Honeywell), the computer manufacturer, bringing it under the 
influence of the large and diversified company Saint-Gobain-Pont-a- 
Mousson. Cii Honeywell Bull was itself an enterprise initiated by the 
French state in 1976 and subsidised throughout the seventies as an attempt 
to  make France less dependent on IBM. Saint-Gobian, itself 6 per cent 
state-owned, took major control of Cii Honeywell Bull by acquiring a 20 per 
cent holding when CGE withdrew in 1979. At the same time, Saint-Gobain 
also managed to  gain a 23 per cent stake in the Italian firm Olivetti during 
1979 in order to consolidate its prospects for IT. The third interest is the 
Thomson group, an electric and electronics conglomerate, whose sub- 
sidiary Thomson-CSF reorganised in 1979 to establish Thornson-CSF 
Informatique. Thomson has hcrn allotted a major part in the strategy of 
establishing a strong and independent French IT industry: t o  this end the 
French government supported it by persuading ITT and Ericsson to  
relinquish t o  Thomson the controlling shares in their French subsidiaries. 
What is particularly interesting about the French example is the self- 
conscious and articulate nature of the attempt to co-ordinate the interests 
of individual capital through the state in order to lay down the founda- 
tions of the 'information society'. It represents an explicit attempt to  
maintain 'economic stability, the social consensus, and national inde- 
pendence'. In the face of social disruption, Noi-a and Minc hold on to the 
futuristic mirage of a 'post-industrial' society: echoing McLuhan, they 
argue that the computer 'will alter the entire nervous system of social 
organisation'. They write of 'the real upheaval of civilisation for which 
the computer revolution may be responsible'. Here the strategies of state 
and capital fuse with the ideology of a post-industrial utopia. 
2. Japan The French strategy is modelled on the Japanese plan for an 
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'information society'. As with the French, so too the Japanese look to  a 
post-industrial future, regarding IT-again echoing McLuhan-as the 
'nervous system of the future economy'.28 However, behind this plan, 
which has been nurtured for over a decade, lies an aggressive commercial 
strategy. The aim has been to  develop an indigenous computer industry 
and a strong domestic IT sector on the basis of which it would be possible 
to expand into foreign markets. This would replicate the successful 
strategy previously adopted with consumer electronics (radio, TV, video, 
etc.). 
The Japanese state has played an especially active and directing role in 
laying the foundations of the 'information age'. This strategy has deve- 
loped through a combination of protectionism, preferential purchase, 
selective joint deals with high technology foreign corporations, consider- 
able state guidance and support for R&D, and state-guided corporate 
co-operation in the genesis of IT systems. Arguably the most important 
moves have been pioneered by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), 
the government institution which, like all telecommunications mono- 
polies, is charged with laying an IT infrastructure. For years NTT has 
nurtured domestic industry by buying almost exclusively from a group of 
Japanese telecommunications equipment firms. Claiming that this is 
essential t o  assure standards and protocols, it has offered the security of 
guaranteed markets t o  such concerns as NEC, Hitachi and Oki Electric. 
In this way NTT is working towards a sophisticated telecommunications 
infrastructure, using digital switching systems, to  provide advanced data, 
text and image services. 
In any discussion of Japan's interests in IT it is necessary to  consider 
not only the especially enthusiastic and determined part played by the 
state, but also the nature of the zaibatsu corporations which dominate the 
economy. A legacy of pre-war Japan, the zaibatsu regrouped in the fifties 
when anti-trust legislation was eased. Critical for this regrouping was the 
fact that zaibatsu banks had been left untouched in the general dissolution 
following the war, and they were therefore able to  take a lead in the re- 
structuring of Japanese industry. There is some mystery about their 
operations, but there is no  doubt about the importance of this 'highly 
important grouping of independent enterprises, clustering around one or 
several core city banks, with some co-ordination of policies, some joint 
action even, and personal regular meetings of the presidents'.29 The 
Mitsubishi (86 firms in the group), Mitsui (71), Sumitomo (go), Furukawa, 
Fujo and Matsushita trading groups play a particularly important part in 
IT, including as they do such interests as Toshiba, NEC, JVC and Fujitsu. 
These zaibatsu are especially powerful and competitive because their size 
and structure-the electronic companies are already largely vertically 
integrated with considerable horizontal integration-make them capable 
of drawing on the necessary internal resources for development of high 
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technology. In this situation the inclusion of banks, which typically 
supply about 30 per cent of a member company's debt within each of the 
zaibatsu, is of special significance. 
Japan has pre-eminently developed a corporatist structure in the post- 
war period. Its 
very high rate of capital accumulation has been achieved through an interlocking 
system of government supervision and private exploitation which has n o  equal in 
the other advanced capitalist countries. . . over 90 per cent of  all government 
activity was devoted to  looking after business.30 
This alliance of large interconnected corporations and directive state 
power makes for a mighty challenge to  US supremacy in IT. 
3 .  Britain. Britain provides an enigmatic case of the relationship between 
state and IT industry. Under the Labour government policy was develop- 
ing in a way similar-though more piecemeal and less ideologically self- 
conscious-to the French strategy. In November 1978 the Labour 
administration committed a total of E400 million with the aim of forming 
an integrated IT industry made t ~ p  essentially of four strands: Inmos (for 
the manufacture of semiconductor devices), Insac (for programming), 
Data Recording Instruments (for computer peripherals), Nexos (for the 
important office equipm;nt market). These were all to be under the 
auspices of the National Enterprise Board (NEB) which undertook a five 
year plan of action. In addition, Labour also introduced a Microelectronics 
Industry Support Programme with financial support to bolster private 
investment and a Microprocessor Application Project t o  help 'educate 
opinion' about the virtues of IT. This was combined with plans for the 
Post Office to develop advanced telecommunications services: in recent 
years it has been introducing electronic switching equipment (the well- 
known System X is essential for IT), data and facsimile transmission 
services, and the Prestel viewdata system. These ambitious and co-ordinated 
plans suggested a coherent approach to  IT which could not be matched in 
its cope by the private sector. 
However, in May 1979 the Thatcher government came to power 
doctrinally opposed to  state-supported initiatives in the economy. Already 
a shadow industry minister had expressed the view that Conservatives 
were 'deeply sceptical of the whole Inmos venture' while arguing that 
private enterprise be left alone to develop the new technology. At the 
same time disquiet was voiced about the Post Office concerning its unfair 
monopoly, its inefficiency, its inability to cope with rapid technological 
change, etc. More generally, leading figures articulated direct opposition 
to the spread of corporatism in the UK and called for a 'return' t o  free 
enterprisc3' 
In line with such attitudes expressed against 'collectivist' solutions to 
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problems posed by IT the new government commenced a campaign aimed 
at  disposing of NEB assets. To this end various companies were placed in 
the hands of the receiver, a 50 per cent holding in Ferranti was returned to  
the private sector and the state's 25 per cent interest in ICL wasrelinquish- 
ed. It is this emphasis on the private sector that, characteristically, lies 
behind Conservative policy. The government would appear to  consider 
that it is possible to  emulate the American (rather than the French) model: 
that competition in the IT industry will yield optimum results. At the 
same time as the Tories are trying to hold back on direct state inter- 
vention in the IT business, however, it hardly needs noting that i t  is 
vigorously encouraging the use of IT to  strengthen capital in general, 
especially by bolstering the control agencies, summed up in the apt slogan 
'strong state: free market'. 
Whilst they may be reluctant to  become the bureaucrats of a managed 
and administered post-industrial society the Conservatives are not, how- 
ever, blind to  the need t o  play some role in this industry. Significantly, 
Sir Keith Joseph hesitated to  'privatise' all the NEB's investments, parti- 
cularly its IT holdings, coming round to  recognising its role as a banker 
supporting a new technology that is still in an embryonic (and tender) 
condition. The minister redefined the NEB's function with regard to  IT 
as 'a catalytic investment role, especially in connection with advanced 
technology and increasingiy in partnership with the private sector'. More- 
over, while shying away from an avowed corporatist strategy the govern- 
ment must necessarily continue to fulfil traditional functions for the 
electronics industry in order to  stimulate the 'natural tendencies' of 
individual electronics capitals. I t  is, for instance, playing an active part in 
encouraging the consolidation of indigenous private industries involved in 
IT, the better to  resist overseas competitors. The NEB and the Department 
of Industry, for example, tried during 1979 to promote a merger of 
Plessey's telecommunications equipment side with that of GEC, and 
earlier the NEB had attempted to  persuade STC to  merge with Plessey. 
In addition, there were n o  stumbling blocks put up to  recent GEC, Racal 
and Thorn takeovers. 
Without state involvement the British IT industry would certainly be 
in danger of collapse. The public sector, for example, absorbs about one 
third of British computer capacity while under a preferential procurement 
policy almost all government computer orders worth over £100,000 are 
awarded to  ICL. Elsewhere, we find that Plessey achieved 39 per cent of its 
total sales in 1979-80 to the Post Office and government departments. 
And, commenting recently on the sale of a £2.3 million satellite com- 
munications station to Nepal, a GEC representative conceded that but 
for the push from British Telecom's initial orders 'GEC wouldn't be in 
that business'. The major sponsor of the electronics industry-as in the 
case of all advanced capitalist countries-has, of course, been the Ministry 
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of ~ e f e n c e . ~ '  Very significant elements of Racal, Decca, GEC, Thorn-EMI, 
Plessey and Ferranti are constituted by the British market for weaponry.33 
The Conservative government has been reluctant, however, t o  extend 
state involvement beyond these 'traditional' responsibilities. Nonetheless, 
whilst i t  may be ideologically inclined towards free enterprise it has not 
been able in practice to  fully repudiate the 'French model'. A measure of 
its present dilemma may be seen in its ambivalent attitude towards the 
Post Office the splitting of which in 1980 t o  free telecommunications 
from the postal services was a sign of government recognition of com- 
munications' importance for IT. While this action-along with the 'privati- 
sation' of various aspects of British Telecom's monopoly such as supply 
and maintenance of terminal equipment-has been interpreted by some as 
part of the government's 'free enterprise' strategy (which it is), and as the 
'denationalisation' of an institution established by the state, it remains a 
fact that the government has left the monopoly over the basic network 
intact with British Telecom retaining the monopoly on installation of 
first telephones, on the maintenance of PABX equipment and with the 
Department of Industry issuing licenses for suppliers of both equipment 
and services (effectively giving the minister control over the amount and 
degree of competition). 
The Conservative government's policy of giving rein to  private capital 
is therefore necessarily guarded. Important factors pertaining to the 
strategic nature, and the size and potential impact of IT, make it difficult 
for any state to  extricate itself. In the light of the concerted programmes 
being drawn up in France and Japan, i t  is difficult t o  see how a strategy 
fully committed to  'free enterprise' could really serve the long-term 
interests of capital in the UK. 
Corrclusion 
An aim in this article has been t o  take consideration of IT out of what we 
feel has been an overly economic and technical forum of debate and to  
begin to situate it in the context of broader social relations of contem- 
porary capitalism. In what has been a deliberately wide-ranging discussion 
we have sought to  explore three major areas that should be of concern to  
socialists. Firstly, we have argued the need to  take seriously the current 
wave of futurism that popularises IT: it represents a significant phenomenon 
and threatens to set the terms of popular debate. Secondly, we have 
stressed the importance of focusing on the real forces behind the 
'information revolution'. I t  is essential to document, t o  publicise and to 
criticise the activities of the powerful multinational corporations that are 
now monopolising the IT sector and shaping innovation as an expression 
of the needs of capital. Finally, we have sought to  indicate ways in which 
IT is centrally implicated, outside the USA, in a process of increasingly 
corporatist capitalism. 
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At present this article can only be a tentativeexploration of what appear 
to  be significant tendencies in the development of capitalist societies. None- 
theless, IT is being constituted, not  as a liberating technology, but as one 
that will facilitate the institution of the rule of capital across ever wider 
spheres of social existence. The extensive influence of this new technology 
will be felt not  just in the workplace (through the discipline of the labour 
process) but beyond-in both the public sphere (as a tool of administrative 
and political processes) and the private sphere (through the further privati- 
sation of leisure). Information technology is deeply implicated within the 
process of planning and integration that is increasingly co-ordinated by the 
state in alliance with large corporations. I t  is this process of capitalist 
centralisation and concentration that lies behind that aspect of the post- 
industrial ideal that focuses upon a planned, administered and technocratic 
organisation. 
However, Daniel Bell refers to  another aspect of futurist aspirations: the 
tendency towards decentralisation. For him, 'the revolution in communica- 
tions allows for a large diversity of cultural expressions and the enhance- 
ment of different life-styles. . .', for a situation in which 'individuals can 
create their own modes of communication and their own new communi- 
ties'.34 In this observation Bell does locate a significant phenomenon, but 
in posing centralisation/decentralisation as alternatives he in fact obscures 
their inextricable inter-relationship in capitalist society. Decentralisation 
will develop as an aspect within a centralised and integrated structure. We 
are convinced that parallel with increased centralisation of state apparatuses 
and corporations will develop decentralisation, this latter being a tendency 
which will encourage the trend towards privatisation, especially with con- 
sumer goods and entertainment (video games, video discs, home computers, 
etc.), but extending even further. 
There are signs within advanced capitalist society of disenchantment 
with that phase of accumulation built upon mass production and mass 
consumption as a way of life. Michel Aglietta and Monique Fouet have 
pointed to 
the questioning of repetitive work, the failure of the 'great society' to attenuate 
discrimination concealed within the mode of consumption, the appearance of a 
social awareness of inequality and of militant movements aiming explicitly to  
equalise living conditions, the exposure of the waste of natural resources. . . All 
these constitute so many factors dissolving the previous logic of growth. . . and 
provoking serious conflicts that fail to respect traditional social divisions. 35 
Aglietta and Fouet argue that we are HOW witnessing a 'general trans- 
formation of the mode of growth': the formation of 'a new coherence of 
social production' that points to  a more flexible and decentralised phase of 
accumulation. This theme is taken up by Norman Macrae of the Economist 
in an article that pronounces the demise of 'the Henry Ford manufacturing 
268 THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1981 
age'36 and looks to greater decentralisation of work and leisure. This 
would entail the growth of parcellised and disseminated labour processes. 
In the longer term, for example, Macrae envisages the growth of home- 
workers 'telecommuting' via domestic data-processing terminals-precisely 
the scenario set in Peter Large's futuristic The Micro Revolution. IT also 
facilitates the individualisation of consumption, the provision of tailor- 
made (and Taylor-made) consumer goods:' 'custom-built production a t  
mass-production prices'. For Macrae 'the place where the world is going to  
is called consumers' freedom'. We see it as the increasing fragmentation of 
work and leisure activities alongside the concentration of the power of 
our rulers. 
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